Arthur Candelario vs. Marlene Candelario
Arthur Candelario vs. Marlene Candelario
Arthur A. Candelario, petitioner, vs. Marlene E. Candelario and the Office of the Solicitor General, respondents.
G.R. No. 222068, July 25, 2023
Supreme Court - First Division
Ponente: Justice Hernando
- Arthur and Marlene were married in a civil ceremony on June 11, 1984. Their only child was born on May 14, 1985.
- Marlene left for Singapore to work as a domestic helper in October 1987 and left the child in Arthur’s custody. Arthur worked as a farmer.
- During Marlene’s absence Arthur frequented nightclubs, formed a relationship with another woman, and cohabited with her; Marlene returned in October 1989 and discovered cohabitation, after which she permanently separated from Arthur and took custody of the child.
- Arthur continued to live with his partner and had four children with her.
- More than twenty years later Arthur filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on January 18, 2013, alleging psychological incapacity under Article 36, Family Code.
- Marlene was served but did not file a written answer; the RTC ordered a prosecutor’s investigation which found no collusion between the parties; Marlene did not appear at pre-trial; the case proceeded to trial.
- Evidence at trial: plaintiff’s testimony (Arthur) and a Judicial Affidavit and Psychiatric Report of Dr. Daisy L. Chua‑Daquilanea diagnosing Dependent Personality Disorder and recommending nullity; Dr. Chua‑Daquilanea relied on interviews, mental status exams, physical exams, and collateral data from three informants.
- The RTC admitted petitioner’s evidence, found psychological incapacity established but denied the Petition on the ground that the Family Code (Art. 36) was not yet in effect when the marriage was contracted on June 11, 1984.
- Arthur moved for reconsideration; the RTC denied it (December 7, 2015). Arthur filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
- Procedural history before the Supreme Court: OSG impleaded; initial dismissal by the Court for procedural deficiencies; subsequent motions and filings led the Court to resolve on the merits; Marlene did not file a comment; OSG argued Art. 36 may apply retroactively.
Issues
- Can Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity) be retroactively applied to marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988?
- Did petitioner prove psychological incapacity within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant nullity of the marriage?
Ruling
- Yes - Article 36 may be applied retroactively insofar as such application does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights; Art. 256 and the amendment to Art. 39 support retroactivity and imprescriptibility.
- No - Petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity by clear and convincing evidence; the record lacks adequate showing of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability as required under Article 36 and as expounded in recent jurisprudence.
- Retroactivity:
- The Court read Articles 36, 39, and 256 of the Family Code together. Art. 256 provides that the Code “shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The amendment to Art. 39 removed the prescriptive limitation and made the action for absolute nullity imprescriptible.
- The Family Code Revision Committee considered retroactivity and voted in favor of retroactivity (as reflected in legislative history discussed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995)), and prior Supreme Court decisions have applied Art. 36 to marriages contracted before August 3, 1988.
- The RTC’s refusal to apply Art. 36 solely because the marriage predated the Family Code was erroneous; retroactive application is permissible provided no vested rights are prejudiced and none were shown in the record.
- Proof of psychological incapacity:
- The Court applied the standards refined in Tan‑Andal v. Andal (G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021) and subsequent cases: psychological incapacity must be grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable; the plaintiff must prove the existence of a durable personality structure manifesting through consistent acts of dysfunction that make it impossible to understand and comply with essential marital obligations; proof must be by clear and convincing evidence.
- Expert testimony is not indispensable; ordinary witnesses who observed consistent behavior may testify. Nonetheless, the totality of evidence must establish the requisite elements.
- The Court found Dr. Chua‑Daquilanea’s Psychiatric Report deficient: it lacked specific data demonstrating how petitioner’s personality structure rendered him incapable of performing essential marital obligations; it did not sufficiently establish a genuine psychic cause, the incurability of the condition, or clear proof of juridical antecedence (witnesses’ knowledge before marriage was not shown).
- The report’s general conclusions (e.g., petitioner “had no regrets” and “did not show consistent ability to assume responsibilities”) were inadequate to meet the high standard required for nullity under Art. 36; petitioner’s failure to make sufficient efforts to preserve the marriage can reflect neglect or choice, not irremediable psychological incapacity.
- Conclusion: Although Art. 36 applies to pre‑Code marriages, petitioner did not satisfy the evidentiary threshold; therefore, the marriage must be preserved.
Citations: Arts. 36, 39, 256, Family Code; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995); Tan‑Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021; Republic v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378 (2014); other cited jurisprudence cited in the record.
- The Family Code (including Article 36 on psychological incapacity) may be applied retroactively to marriages contracted before the Code’s effectivity, provided such application does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights (Art. 256).
- An action for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is imprescriptible following amendment to Article 39.
- Requirements for psychological incapacity under Article 36:
- Gravity: the incapacity must be serious enough to preclude ordinary marital obligations.
- Juridical antecedence: the incapacity must exist at the time of marriage.
- Incurability: in the legal sense, the personality structure must make reconciliation or treatment impracticable so the marriage’s breakdown is inevitable.
- Standard of proof: clear and convincing evidence, relying on the totality of evidence; expert testimony may assist but is not indispensable; ordinary witnesses may prove enduring personality structure (Tan‑Andal).
- The Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
- The March 6, 2015 Judgment and the December 7, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Antique, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 2013-01-3848 are AFFIRMED.
- The marriage between Arthur A. Candelario and Marlene E. Candelario is declared VALID and SUBSISTING.
- Chief Justice Gesmundo, Justice Zalameda, and Justice Marquez concurred with the decision.
- Justice Rosario was on leave.
- No dissenting opinion is stated in the decision.
- Clarifies that Article 36 of the Family Code applies to marriages contracted before August 3, 1988, reinforcing prior jurisprudence and the retroactivity provision of Article 256.
- Reiterates the high evidentiary standard for annulment for psychological incapacity: grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable, proven by clear and convincing evidence; expert reports must offer specific, corroborated evidence linking a personality structure to incapacity in marital obligations.
- Affirms Tan‑Andal’s framework: expert opinion is helpful but not essential; ordinary witnesses may establish enduring dysfunctional personality traits if they can show consistent behavior antecedent to marriage.
- Practical implication: petitioners seeking annulment under Art. 36 must present thorough, specific evidence (medical/psychiatric and corroborative witnesses) demonstrating the three statutory requisites; general or conclusory psychiatric assessments are insufficient.
- Procedural note: absent respondent’s failure to appear and present evidence may result in waiver of opportunities to assert vested rights; however, any claim that retroactive application prejudices vested rights must be timely and substantiated.
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