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Agnes Georfo vs. Republic of the Philippines and Joe-Ar Georfo

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Agnes Georfo vs. Republic of the Philippines and Joe-Ar Georfo

Case Title and Citation

Agnes Padrique Georfo, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines and Joe-Ar Jabian Georfo, respondents.
G.R. No. 246933, March 06, 2023
Supreme Court - Second Division
Ponente: Justice Leonen, SAJ.

Facts

  • In late 2001, petitioner Agnes Padrique met respondent Joe-Ar Jabian Georfo in Bacolod City. Four months later, Agnes moved to her uncle’s place in Toboso, Negros Occidental where she and Joe-Ar shared a room. Family pressure led to their marriage.
  • On February 23, 2002, Agnes (then 18) and Joe-Ar (then 21) were married at the Latter Day Saints Church in Magsungay, Bacolod City. They later had a son.
  • After marriage, the couple lived with Joe-Ar’s family despite Agnes’s objections; Agnes complained of mistreatment by Joe-Ar’s family and alleged neglect when she became ill.
  • Agnes alleged repeated physical abuse by Joe-Ar, his infidelities (including fathering two children with another woman), and failure to provide financial support for their son. The marriage deteriorated and they lived separately for eight years.
  • Agnes filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
  • At trial, Dr. Andres Gerong, a clinical psychologist, testified for petitioner. He conducted interviews with Agnes and Agnes’s sister, Cherry Mae P. Valencia. Joe-Ar did not submit to or participate in a psychological evaluation.
  • Dr. Gerong’s assessment concluded respondent exhibited trait patterns consistent with Narcissistic Personality Disorder and dependent personality traits; he described the condition as serious, rooted in childhood/family dynamics, and enduring/incurable in the relevant sense.
  • Cherry Mae corroborated petitioner’s account based on her observations while staying with the parties. Respondent did not present evidence.
  • On March 3, 2016, the Regional Trial Court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void ab initio under Article 36.
  • The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration and appealed. The Court of Appeals, applying the Molina guidelines, set aside the trial court decision in a July 16, 2018 Decision and dismissed the petition, reasoning the psychological report lacked probative value because the expert did not personally examine respondent and failed to identify root cause, antecedence, and incurability as required.
  • Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the Court of Appeals, and declared the marriage void for psychological incapacity.

Issues

  1. Whether the marriage between petitioner and respondent is void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity (Yes/No)?
  2. Whether the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity (Yes/No)?
  3. Whether a psychiatric/psychological examination of the allegedly incapacitated spouse is indispensable in Article 36 cases (Yes/No)?
  4. Whether an expert psychological/psychiatric report based on collateral information (e.g., interviews of the spouse and relatives) is admissible and probative (Yes/No)?

Ruling

  1. Yes - The Court found the marriage void under Article 36 due to respondent’s psychological incapacity as established by the totality of evidence.
  2. Yes - The totality of evidence, including the expert report and corroborating witness testimony, met the clear and convincing standard to prove psychological incapacity.
  3. No - A personal psychiatric/psychological examination of the allegedly incapacitated spouse is not indispensable; an expert evaluation may be based on collateral information where necessary.
  4. Yes - An expert report based on collateral sources may be admissible and probative if reliable and supported by other evidence.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Article 36 recognizes that a marriage is void when a party was psychologically incapacitated at the time of celebration to comply with essential marital obligations. The Court reviewed the jurisprudential development from Santos, Molina, and Tan-Andal.
  • The Molina guidelines (1997) imposed rigid medical/clinical identification requirements for the root cause, personal examination, and proof of permanence/incurability, leading to many dismissals. The Court in Tan-Andal (2021) refined these rules:
    1. The quantum of proof is clear and convincing evidence, given the presumption in favor of marriage’s validity.
    2. Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not strictly a medical/clinical diagnosis; requiring a specific medical label is unnecessary.
    3. Proof must still show the three characteristics: gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, but these may be demonstrated through the “personality structure” and durable behavior patterns.
    4. Expert evidence is useful but not indispensable; psychiatric/psychological evaluations may rely on collateral information where the respondent is unavailable or refuses examination.
  • Applying Tan-Andal, the Court found petitioner met the burden: Dr. Gerong, a qualified clinical psychologist, provided an expert assessment—based on interviews with petitioner and her sister—that traced respondent’s narcissistic and dependent personality traits to childhood/family environment, and described an enduring pattern that undermined essential marital obligations.
  • The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ per se exclusion of the report for lack of personal examination and noted prior decisions (Camacho-Reyes, Tan-Andal) accepting collateral-based expert evaluations. The Court also held that using an older version of the DSM does not negate the legal weight of a psychological assessment.
  • Given the expert report, corroboration by petitioner’s sister, respondent’s non-participation, and the totality of evidence showing chronic neglect, abuse, infidelity, and inability to perform marital duties, the three Santos/Tan-Andal elements (gravity, antecedence in all reasonable likelihood, and legal incurability relative to the spouse) were satisfied.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Psychological incapacity under Article 36 is a legal concept distinct from medical diagnosis; it focuses on a durable personality structure that makes compliance with essential marital obligations impossible.
  • The required characteristics are: gravity (serious dysfunction), juridical antecedence (existence at or prior to marriage, to a reasonable likelihood), and incurability in the legal sense (enduring incompatibility that undermines the marriage).
  • Burden and standard of proof: petitioner bears the burden to prove nullity by clear and convincing evidence.
  • Psychiatric/psychological evaluation is helpful but not mandatory; experts may rely on collateral information when the respondent is unavailable or refuses evaluation.
  • The specific version of diagnostic manuals (e.g., DSM) is not determinative of legal sufficiency.

Disposition

  • The petition is GRANTED.
  • The July 16, 2018 Decision and March 5, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 06219 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
  • The marriage of Agnes Padrique Georfo and Joe-Ar Jabian Georfo is declared VOID on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Justices Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.
  • No dissenting opinion is indicated in the decision.

Significance / Notes

  • Clarifies and applies Tan-Andal: the Court reaffirmed that psychological incapacity is a legal concept and relaxed Molina’s rigid medical-centric requirements.
  • Confirms that expert evaluations based on collateral information can be probative; a personal examination of the respondent is not per se required.
  • Reinforces the clear-and-convincing standard and the three-element test (gravity, antecedence, incurability) for Article 36 cases, focusing on personality structure and enduring behavioral patterns.
  • Holds that clinical taxonomies (DSM versions) are not dispositive in determining legal psychological incapacity.
  • Practical implication: courts may give weight to expert reports derived from petitioners and corroborating witnesses where other reliable sources exist and the totality of evidence supports the claim.
Persons and Family Relations
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