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Aida Egmalis-Ke-eg vs. Republic of the Philippines

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Aida Egmalis-Ke-eg vs. Republic of the Philippines

Case Title and Citation

Aida Egmalis-Ke-eg, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
G.R. No. 249178, July 13, 2022
Supreme Court - Third Division
Ponente: Inting, J.

Facts

  • Petitioner Aida filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging respondent Ireneo was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations.
  • Aida and Ireneo met in high school and dated about two years. In 1982 Aida became pregnant; the elders of their Kankana-ey community arranged their wedding on January 18, 1983.
  • A son, Kurk, was born on July 2, 1983.
  • The couple never fixed a family domicile and relied on their families for support. They acquired no property during the marriage.
  • Ireneo was described as habitually drinking, irresponsible, verbally/emotionally abusive, unwilling to seek employment, and allegedly involved in a murder case; he did not visit or support the child and there was no communication with Aida since 1988.
  • Aida worked abroad (Singapore from July 1986; later Hong Kong and England) and supported the child and family.
  • Witness Claire Egmalis-Dagdag (Aida’s sister) testified regarding Ireneo’s failure to support and his drinking and troublemaker reputation.
  • Psychologist Michelle Nabua testified and diagnosed Aida with Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder and Ireneo with Antisocial Personality Disorder; Ms. Nabua opined both were psychologically incapacitated and that their disorders were deeply rooted and incurable.
  • The Office of the Solicitor General cross‑examined Aida and witnesses but offered no evidence.
  • Regional Trial Court (Branch 30, City of San Fernando, La Union) Decision dated February 1, 2017 declared the marriage void ab initio due to psychological incapacity of both parties.
  • Court of Appeals Decision dated October 29, 2018 reversed the RTC, finding the evidence insufficient to establish Ireneo’s psychological incapacity and noting Aida had not pleaded her own incapacity; CA Resolution dated July 24, 2019 denied reconsideration.
  • Petitioner sought review under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the marriage between Aida and Ireneo is null and void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of either or both of them to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?
  2. Whether the RTC may grant a relief not prayed for in the petition, i.e., declare Aida psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations?

Ruling

  1. Yes - The marriage is null and void ab initio because Ireneo is psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations; the Court found clear and convincing evidence supporting this conclusion.
  2. No - The RTC may not properly grant relief not prayed for absent clear and convincing evidence; Aida’s alleged psychological incapacity was not established by the required proof.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Governing law and standards:
    1. Article 36, Family Code provides that a marriage is void if, at celebration, a party was psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations.
    2. Precedents define psychological incapacity in terms of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability (Santos v. Court of Appeals; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina) and were refined by Tan-Andal v. Andal, which:
      • Clarified psychological incapacity is not strictly a diagnosable mental illness or personality disorder; courts should assess enduring aspects of personality structure manifested by acts of dysfunctionality undermining the family.
      • Recast incurability to a legal, not medical, concept — durability and incompatibility of personality structures making marriage inevitably break down.
    3. The burden of proof rests on the petitioner; doubts resolved in favor of marriage continuation (Molina).
    4. Courts should consider expert opinion as persuasive evidence though not an absolute requirement; expert assessments may rely on collateral information if the subject is unavailable.
    5. Courts cannot grant reliefs not sought in the pleadings without due process to the opposing party (Gaffney v. Butler; related authorities).
  • Application to facts:
    1. The totality of evidence (witness testimony and Ms. Nabua’s evaluation) established an enduring pattern of dysfunctionality by Ireneo: habitual drinking, verbal/emotional abuse, persistent irresponsibility, failure to seek employment or support his child, living as a bachelor despite marriage, and community reputation as a troublemaker. These acts satisfied the Molina/Tan-Andal elements of gravity, juridical antecedence (existing at marriage celebration), and legal incurability (persistent incompatibility with spouse).
    2. Ms. Nabua’s diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder and her evaluation—though based in part on collateral information—was given weight in light of Tan-Andal’s allowance for expert opinion. The Court found the expert opinion and factual record collectively clear and convincing that Ireneo was psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations.
    3. As to Aida, the Court found the evidence did not show psychological incapacity: she demonstrated understanding of marital obligations, took steps to support the family (working abroad), and her conduct did not exhibit the disabling dysfunctionality required by Article 36.
    4. The RTC erred in declaring both parties incapacitated where Aida had not pleaded such incapacity and where clear and convincing evidence was lacking; due process and the burden of proof preclude granting relief not specifically established by the pleadings and proof.
  • Conclusion: CA decision reversed; RTC decision partially reversed in that only Ireneo’s psychological incapacity warranted nullity.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Article 36 nullity requires proof that a party’s personality structure produces durable dysfunctionality undermining essential marital obligations (gravity, juridical antecedence, legal incurability as refined by Tan-Andal).
  • Burden of proof is on petitioner; standard is clear and convincing evidence; doubts resolved in favor of marriage.
  • Expert psychological opinion is persuasive and may be based on collateral information, but is not an absolute prerequisite.
  • A court should not grant relief not prayed for in the pleadings absent proper notice and proof; due process bars entering relief beyond what was sought.

Disposition

  • The petition for review is GRANTED.
  • The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 29, 2018 and Resolution dated July 24, 2019 in CA-G.R. CV No. 108998 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
  • The marriage between petitioner Aida Egmalis-Ke-eg and respondent Ireneo Ke-eg is declared NULL AND VOID ab initio.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Chief Justice Caguioa (Chairperson), Justices Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh concurred.
  • No dissenting opinions noted.

Significance / Notes

  • Reinforces Tan-Andal calibration of Article 36: psychological incapacity assessed by durable personality structure and manifest dysfunctional acts rather than strictly by clinical diagnosis.
  • Confirms expert testimony is highly persuasive and may rely on collateral sources when direct evaluation is not possible.
  • Emphasizes petitioner’s burden of clear and convincing proof in nullity actions and the court’s duty to resolve doubts in favor of marriage continuity.
  • Affirms that trial courts cannot grant reliefs beyond those pleaded without adequate notice and proof, especially in Article 36 nullity proceedings.
  • Illustrates that cultural or community-arranged marriages may bear on findings of juridical antecedence when one party lacked intent or understanding at celebration.
Persons and Family Relations Remedial Law Due Process
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