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Ernestina Bernabe vs. Carolina Alejo

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Ernestina Bernabe vs. Carolina Alejo

Case Title and Citation

Ernestina Bernabe, petitioner, vs. Carolina Alejo as guardian ad litem for the minor Adrian Bernabe, respondent.
G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002
Supreme Court - Third Division
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Facts

  • The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son, Adrian Bernabe, was born on September 18, 1981.
  • Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993; his wife Rosalina died on December 3, 1993. Ernestina Bernabe is the sole surviving heir.
  • On May 16, 1994, Carolina Alejo, for and in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint to have Adrian declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and to claim Adrian’s share in Bernabe’s estate, then held by Ernestina.
  • The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on July 16, 1995, later granting reconsideration and ordering dismissal on July 26, 1995; an additional Order was issued on October 6, 1995, citing Article 175 of the Family Code and lack of written acknowledgment.
  • The Court of Appeals, in a July 7, 1999 Decision (CA-GR CV No. 51919), reversed and set aside the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for trial on the merits. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by CA Resolution on October 14, 1999.
  • Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking nullification of the CA Decision and Resolution and reinstatement of the RTC orders.

Issues

  1. Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
  2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the attainment of majority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of the Family Code.
  3. Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.

Ruling

  1. Yes - Respondent has a cause of action to file for recognition and related relief despite the putative father’s death and absence of written acknowledgment, where the claim is governed by vested rights under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
  2. Yes - The Court of Appeals did not err; Article 285 of the Civil Code afforded a vested substantive right to minors to bring an action within four years after attaining majority, and the Family Code cannot impair vested rights.
  3. No - The petition is not fatally defective for failing to implead the Court of Appeals; under current Rule 45 practice, impleading the lower court is no longer required.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Article 285 of the Civil Code provided that an action for recognition “may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except” where (1) a parent died during the child’s minority and the child may file within four years after attaining majority, or (2) a document later appears recognizing the child, within four years from discovery. The Court regarded this provision as creating a substantive, vested right for minors in the circumstances described.
  • The Family Code (Arts. 172, 173, 175, 255) omitted the exceptions in Article 285 and generally required that actions be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent; however, Article 255 preserves vested or acquired rights existing at the Family Code’s enactment.
  • The Court applied the vested-rights doctrine: a vested right is “absolute, complete and unconditional” and not dependent on a contingency. The right under Article 285 vested insofar as minors whose parent died during their minority could not themselves have sued while minors and thus had a substantive right to sue within four years after achieving majority.
  • The Court distinguished procedural from substantive law using precedent (Bustos v. Lucero; Fabian v. Desierto) and concluded Article 285 is substantive because it creates and fixes a substantive right (the time-limited right to recognition) rather than merely prescribing a remedial procedure.
  • Prior cases were relied upon: Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals was inapplicable because the claimant there was no longer a minor when asserting recognition; Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Divinagracia v. Rovira supported the application of Article 285 (and its period) to minors and to illegitimate/spurious children in similar circumstances.
  • On the nature of “natural” versus “spurious” children, the Court noted that although Article 285 refers to “natural children,” jurisprudence (Aruego; Divinagracia v. Rovira) permits application of the Civil Code recognition rules and prescriptive period to spurious/illegitimate children in order to protect their rights.
  • As to procedure under Rule 45, Section 4(a) and Section 3 (current Rules of Court) do not require impleading lower courts as respondents; failure to implead the Court of Appeals was therefore not reversible error.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Vested substantive rights under prior law are protected from impairment by subsequent legislation (Family Code Art. 255).
  • Article 285 of the Civil Code grants a substantive right to minors whose putative parent died during their minority to file for recognition within four years after attaining majority.
  • The Family Code does not retroactively extinguish vested rights created under the Civil Code.
  • Recognition rules and prescriptive periods applicable to “natural” children may, in equity and by precedent, be applied to spurious/illegitimate children for purposes of proof and succession.
  • Under current Rule 45 practice, impleading the lower court (Court of Appeals) as respondent is not required.

Disposition

  • The Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
  • The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 7, 1999 (CA-GR CV No. 51919) and the October 14, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
  • Costs against petitioner.
  • Effect: respondent (through guardian ad litem) may proceed under the remanded proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals’ directive; the minor retains the four-year period from attaining majority to seek recognition under Article 285 as a vested right.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Melo (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
  • Vitug, J., took no part.

Significance / Notes

  • Protects minors’ vested substantive rights to recognition when a putative parent dies during minority; legislation enacted later (Family Code) cannot abridge such vested rights.
  • Clarifies that Article 285’s four-year post-majority period applies to minors who were minors when the Family Code took effect, ensuring access to courts for recognition and succession claims.
  • Reaffirms jurisprudential application of Civil Code recognition rules to spurious/illegitimate children for proof of filiation and succession rights.
  • Confirms procedural practice under Rule 45 that lower courts need not be impleaded as respondents in petitions for review on certiorari.
Persons and Family Relations Civil Law Succession Remedial Law
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