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Panfilo M. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

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Panfilo M. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

Case Title and Citation

Panfilo M. Lacson, petitioner, vs. The Executive Secretary, The Sandiganbayan, Office of the Special Prosecutor, The Department of Justice, Myrna Abalora, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Pancho Montero, and The People of the Philippines, respondents.
Romeo M. Acop and Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., petitioner-intervenors.
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
Supreme Court - En Banc
Ponente: Martinez, J.

Facts

  • On May 18, 1995, eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed on Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
  • ABRITG allegedly included officers from the PNP units led by: Chief Supt. Jewel Canson; Chief Supt. Panfilo M. Lacson; Senior Supt. Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.; and Chief Supt. Romeo M. Acop; with other PNP personnel.
  • A Blancaflor-led Ombudsman panel initially absolved the PNP officers; a subsequent review board led by Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa recommended indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents, including Lacson, Acop and Zubia.
  • On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed eleven informations for murder (Criminal Cases Nos. 23047–23057) before the Sandiganbayan; motions for reconsideration were allowed and a reinvestigation ensued.
  • On March 1, 1996, the Ombudsman filed 11 amended informations charging Lacson, Acop and Zubia as accessories after the fact; one accused was dropped.
  • On May 8, 1996, the Sandiganbayan Second Division (per a resolution penned by Justice Demetriou) admitted the amended informations but ordered transfer to the Quezon City RTC under R.A. No. 7975, concluding none of the principal accused held ranks corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher.
  • While motions for reconsideration were pending, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249 (approved February 5, 1997; effective February 25, 1997) which amended Sandiganbayan jurisdiction, notably deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in the prior statute and containing a transitory provision applying the Act to pending cases where trial had not begun (Section 7).
  • On March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied reconsideration but issued an addendum invoking R.A. No. 8249 and retaining jurisdiction, citing that some accused were PNP Chief Superintendents.
  • Petitioner Lacson (joined by intervenors Acop and Zubia) filed this petition for prohibition and mandamus and challenged the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8249 on grounds including bad faith, equal protection, ex post facto/retroactivity, denial of procedural due process and violation of the one-subject-one-title rule.
  • The Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General defended the statute’s constitutionality. The Court required supplemental memoranda on whether the amended informations sufficiently alleged that the crimes were committed in relation to office under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249.

Issues

  1. Do Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8249 violate procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
  2. Is the retroactive/transitory application of R.A. No. 8249 (Section 7) an unconstitutional ex post facto law or otherwise a denial of accuseds’ procedural rights (e.g., two-tiered appeal)?
  3. Does the title of R.A. No. 8249 violate the one-subject-one-title requirement of the Constitution?
  4. Under the allegations of the amended informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047–23057, does the Sandiganbayan have exclusive original jurisdiction over the murder charges (i.e., were the offenses alleged to be committed in relation to office)?
  5. Was the Sandiganbayan’s Addendum to its March 5, 1997 Resolution (retaining jurisdiction) valid?

Ruling

  1. No - Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8249 are constitutional; challengers failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality.
  2. No - The transitory application of R.A. No. 8249 is not an ex post facto law; the Act is jurisdictional/procedural, not penal, and may apply to pending cases where trial has not begun.
  3. No - The title of R.A. No. 8249 adequately expresses a single subject related to Sandiganbayan jurisdiction; the one-subject-one-title requirement is satisfied.
  4. No - The amended informations do not sufficiently allege that the murders were committed in relation to the accuseds’ official functions; therefore the Sandiganbayan lacks exclusive original jurisdiction over these murder charges.
  5. No - The Sandiganbayan Addendum retaining jurisdiction is reversed and the cases must be transferred to the RTC of Quezon City.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Presumption of constitutionality: Every statute is presumed constitutional; challengers must show a clear constitutional breach (citing Peralta v. COMELEC and related authority). Petitioners/intervenors failed to meet this burden.
  • Equal protection and bad-faith allegations: The Court found no convincing evidence that R.A. No. 8249 was enacted in bad faith or as class legislation targeted solely at the Kuratong Baleleng cases. Legislative classification is permissible if reasonable and the four-part test for reasonable classification was satisfied.
  • Retroactivity and ex post facto: Ex post facto prohibition applies to penal laws that criminalize past innocent acts, increase punishment, change evidentiary rules to defendant’s detriment, or otherwise disadvantage the accused in criminal consequences (Calder v. Bull and subsequent jurisprudence). R.A. No. 8249 is a jurisdictional/procedural statute, not penal; procedural/adjective changes may be applied to pending cases where trial has not begun without violating ex post facto principles. The statutory right to appeal is statutory, not a natural right, and its mode may be regulated.
  • One-subject-one-title: The title of R.A. No. 8249 (“AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN…”) is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the amendments; the requirement is liberally construed.
  • Jurisdictional requirement under Section 4(b): R.A. No. 8249 vests Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over “other offenses or felonies” committed by public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) “in relation to their office.” The constitution and prior statutes require that the information allege facts showing an “intimate connection” between the offense and official functions (People v. Montejo; People v. Magallanes; Republic v. Asuncion).
  • Pleading requirement: Jurisdiction is determined from allegations in the complaint or information, not from evidence at trial; the information must recite facts (not mere conclusions) sufficient to show the offense was committed in relation to office (Rule 110, Sec. 9, Revised Rules of Court; U.S. v. Karelsen and Philippine precedents).
  • Application to the case facts: The amended informations uniformly alleged that principal accused “taking advantage of their public and official positions” committed murder and that certain persons (including Lacson, Acop, Zubia) were charged as accessories after the fact for concealing the crime. The informations lacked specific factual averments showing how the killings were intimately connected with the performance of official duties (e.g., arrests, custody, investigations leading to death). The informations contained inconsistent and vague references (e.g., raid in Paranaque vs. shooting in Quezon City), and thus failed to meet the pleading standard necessary to invoke Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
  • Conclusion on jurisdictional relief: Because the informations did not plead the requisite intimate connection to office, the crime charged is plain murder within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (Sec. 20, B.P. Blg. 129). Consequently, the Sandiganbayan’s retaining of the cases under the Addendum was invalid.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • A statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality; challengers bear a heavy burden to prove otherwise.
  • Ex post facto prohibitions apply to penal laws; procedural or jurisdictional statutes may be applied retroactively to pending cases where trial has not begun.
  • The one-subject-one-title rule is given a practical, liberal construction; titles need only be sufficiently comprehensive to express the law’s general purpose.
  • Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information; factual averments (not legal conclusions) are required to show an offense was committed in relation to public office.
  • An “intimate connection” between the offense and official duties must be pleaded to invoke special court jurisdiction (People v. Montejo; People v. Magallanes).

Disposition

  • The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8249 is sustained.
  • The Addendum to the Sandiganbayan’s March 5, 1997 Resolution is REVERSED.
  • The Sandiganbayan is directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, which has exclusive original jurisdiction over those cases.
  • The petition is denied insofar as it seeks to declare Sections 4 and 7 unconstitutional; the petition is granted insofar as it seeks relief from Sandiganbayan jurisdiction in these specific cases.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • No separate concurring or dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court decision are noted in the source. Justices Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes concurred with the opinion of the Court.

Significance / Notes

  • R.A. No. 8249’s deletion of the word “principal” broadened the statutory scope of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction to include offenses by public officials irrespective of their classification as principal, accomplice or accessory, subject to the requirement that the offense be committed in relation to office.
  • Procedural or jurisdictional amendments may apply to pending cases that have not commenced trial; such transitory provisions are not per se unconstitutional.
  • For courts specially constituted to try public officers, the pleading must allege specific factual circumstances demonstrating an intimate connection between the crime and official functions; mere conclusory statements that an offense was committed “in relation to office” are insufficient.
  • The decision reinforces the principle that jurisdictional questions turn on the factual averments of the charging documents, not on trial evidence.
  • Practical effect: the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases were ordered transferred to the Quezon City RTC for trial despite the broader statutory definition of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
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