Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, et al. vs. Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and NCMH Nurses Association

Posted Sep 21, 1993

By Anonymous

8 min read

Case Title and Citation

Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Lt. Col. Isabelo Banez, Jr., Engr. Conrado Rey Matias, Ms. Cora S. Solis and Ms. Enya N. Lopez, petitioners, vs. Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and NCMH Nurses Association, represented by Raoulito Gayutin, respondents.
G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993
Supreme Court - En Banc
Ponente: QUIASON, J.

Facts

Petitioners were officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH): Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda (Chief of Hospital III), Isabelo C. Banez, Jr. (Administrative Officer III), Conrado Rey Matias (Technical Assistant), Cora C. Solis (Accountant III), and Enya N. Lopez (Supply Officer III).
Private respondent NCMH Nurses Association filed an administrative complaint (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On January 7, 1992 the Ombudsman issued an order directing the preventive suspension of the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 seeking to nullify the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order and to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero from participating in the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners sought injunctive relief and the restoration of status quo; this Court on September 22, 1992 temporarily required respondents to maintain the status quo pending comments.
Private respondent filed an “Omnibus Submission” including motions to hold petitioners’ lawyers in contempt and to disbar them. The Solicitor General filed comments asserting the Ombudsman may only recommend suspension to the head of the department, and that statutory conditions for suspension had not been met.
The Court issued a Resolution on November 25, 1992 ordering restoration of the status quo ante (permitting petitioners to perform duties and receive salary) pending further proceedings.
The core legal question presented was whether the Ombudsman may directly order preventive suspension of public officials of other departments/agencies under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, in light of constitutional provisions (Article XI, Sec. 13(3) and Sec. 13(8) of the 1987 Constitution).
The Ombudsman argued Section 24 R.A. No. 6770, construed with Article XI Sec. 13(8), authorizes preventive suspension; petitioners and the Solicitor General argued the Ombudsman can only recommend suspension under Article XI Sec. 13(3).
The record showed the Ombudsman issued the preventive suspension after petitioners had filed answers and motions, private respondents had filed a reply specifying instances of alleged harassment, and the parties had agreed at a preliminary conference to submit lists of witnesses and documentary evidence.
The Ombudsman’s order was challenged as allegedly issued without affording petitioners an opportunity to be heard and on grounds of alleged bias of investigating officers.
The Court considered precedent (including Nera v. Garcia) and statutory interpretation principles; counsel conduct and pending disciplinary motions were also addressed by the Court.

Issues

Does the Ombudsman have the authority under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before his office, including those employed in other departments or agencies? (Yes/No)
Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by issuing the preventive suspension order without affording petitioners adequate opportunity to be heard and despite alleged partiality of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero? (Yes/No)
Should the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus be granted to nullify the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order and to maintain the status quo? (Yes/No)

Ruling

Yes - The Ombudsman has authority under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before his office, including those employed in other departments or agencies.
No - The Court found no grave abuse of discretion or manifest partiality in the recommendation by Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero; the preventive suspension was issued after filings and a preliminary conference, and the procedural nature of preventive suspension does not require a full hearing before imposition.
No - The petition is dismissed; the Court lifted and set aside the status quo order previously issued and did not grant the requested relief to nullify the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

Statutory authority and constitutional context
1. Section 24, R.A. No. 6770 expressly authorizes the Ombudsman or his Deputy to preventively suspend “any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation” when the evidence of guilt is strong and one or more specified conditions are met (dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct or neglect; charge would warrant removal; continued stay may prejudice the case); preventive suspension may continue until termination by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months except in specified circumstances.
2. Article XI, Section 13(8) of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Ombudsman to exercise such other powers as may be provided by law; Section 13(3) includes the power to “recommend” removal, suspension, demotion, etc. The Court construed these provisions together to allow Congress to furnish the Ombudsman with additional procedural powers by statute.
3. The deletion by Congress of limiting words (e.g., “subordinate” and “in his bureau”) present in earlier statutes indicates legislative intent to permit the Ombudsman to suspend officials charged before his office irrespective of the agency in which they are employed.
Nature of preventive suspension
1. Preventive suspension is procedural, not punitive. Citing Nera v. Garcia, suspension is a preliminary step to facilitate investigation and is not itself the penalty; the penalty, if any, is imposed after disposition of the case.
2. Procedural statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of the Ombudsman statute and the constitutional mandate to enable the Ombudsman to conduct effective investigations.
Discretion and procedural sufficiency
1. Section 24 vests judgment in the Ombudsman to determine when the evidence of guilt is strong and when preventive suspension is necessary to protect the integrity of the investigation (e.g., risk of tampering with evidence or intimidation of witnesses).
2. In the present case the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension was issued after petitioners had filed answers, the private respondent had filed a reply specifying instances of alleged harassment, and both parties had agreed at a preliminary conference to exchange lists of witnesses and documentary exhibits. Under these circumstances, the Court found no showing of manifest partiality or denial of due process sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
3. The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that a full-blown hearing and formal presentation of evidence were prerequisites to preventive suspension.
Procedural remedies for counsel conduct
1. Motions to disbar or to hold counsel in contempt are matters for the appropriate disciplinary or quasi-judicial forum; they have no place in the present special civil action challenging jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.
2. The Court admonished intemperate language by counsel and affirmed that disciplinary procedures are separate.
Concurrence note
1. Justice Bellosillo concurred in the result but expressed concern that the factual record may be insufficient to justify preventive suspension in this instance and suggested oral argument to assess necessity and potential disruption to public service.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

The Ombudsman, under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, may preventively suspend any government official or employee charged before his office, regardless of the agency of employment.
Preventive suspension is a procedural measure (not a penalty) designed to facilitate investigation and preserve the integrity of the process.
Statutory language must be construed in light of constitutional mandates; removal of limiting phrases by Congress evidences intent to confer broader authority on the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman’s discretion to determine when evidence of guilt is strong is entitled to deference unless shown to be exercised with grave abuse.
Disciplinary actions against lawyers and contempt proceedings have separate procedures and fora.

Disposition

The petition is DISMISSED.
The status quo order dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
The Court declined to grant the requested relief to nullify the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order.
The Court declined to entertain motions for contempt and disbarment in this special civil action, noting they belong to the appropriate disciplinary tribunals or the Ombudsman.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

BELLOSILLO, J., concurring: Agreed with the legal conclusion that the Ombudsman has authority under Section 24 to preventively suspend officials charged before him, but expressed concern that the factual showing in this case may be inadequate to justify preventive suspension; recommended oral argument to assess whether suspension was necessary given possible disruption of public service.
No dissenting opinion on record; Feliciano, J., was on leave.

Significance / Notes

Confirms broad statutory power of the Ombudsman to order preventive suspension under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, strengthening the Ombudsman’s investigatory tools.
Clarifies that preventive suspension is procedural and not punitive, and thus may be imposed without a full evidentiary hearing when the conditions of Section 24 are met.
Emphasizes judicial deference to the Ombudsman’s judgment about the necessity of preventive suspension unless grave abuse of discretion is shown.
Signals that motions to discipline counsel and contempt proceedings must follow the proper procedural channels and are not to be litigated in special civil actions under Rule 65.
Highlights judicial caution: even where statutory authority exists, courts should consider the factual necessity of preventive suspensions to avoid undue disruption of public services, as noted in the concurring opinion.

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