McLoughlin vs. O’Brian

Case Title and Citation

Rosina McLoughlin, appellant, vs. Thomas Alan O’Brian, A. E. Docker & Sons Ltd., Raymond Sygrove, and Ernest Doe & Sons Ltd., respondents.
[1982] UKHL 3, May 6, 1982
House of Lords
Lords Wilberforce, Edmund-Davies, Russell of Killowen, Scarman, and Bridge of Harwich

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Facts

• On October 19, 1973, near Withersfield, Suffolk, Rosina McLoughlin’s husband and three of her children were in a Ford car that collided with two lorries driven by the respondents. Negligence was admitted.
• As a result, one child, Gillian (aged 3), died almost instantly; George (17) and Kathleen (7) suffered serious injuries; the husband sustained shock and bruising. Another child, Michael, was in a different car and unharmed.
• McLoughlin was at home two miles away. She was informed of the accident about an hour later, then taken to Addenbrooke’s Hospital, where she witnessed the injuries and distress of her husband and children, learning of Gillian’s death.
• She subsequently developed severe psychiatric illness, described as nervous shock, organic depression, and personality change.
• At trial, Boreham J. held no duty of care was owed because nervous shock was not reasonably foreseeable.
• The Court of Appeal affirmed, though Stephenson LJ accepted foreseeability but denied recovery on policy grounds, while Griffiths LJ held no duty extended beyond persons at or near the accident.
• McLoughlin appealed to the House of Lords.

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Issues

1. Was psychiatric illness from nervous shock in these circumstances reasonably foreseeable?
2. Did the respondents owe a duty of care to McLoughlin, who was not present at the scene but witnessed the immediate aftermath?
3. Should policy considerations limit liability in nervous shock claims to those present at or near the accident?

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Ruling

1. Yes — Nervous shock was reasonably foreseeable.
2. Yes — Duty of care extended to McLoughlin as a close relative encountering the immediate aftermath.
3. No — Policy arguments (floodgates, evidentiary concerns) did not justify denying liability where foreseeability and proximity were present.

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Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

• Lord Wilberforce: The law had evolved from requiring direct impact or presence at the accident to allowing recovery for those coming upon the immediate aftermath. A mother arriving shortly after at the hospital was within the scope of foreseeability. Limiting liability solely to sight or sound at the scene would be arbitrary.
• Lord Edmund-Davies: Public policy cannot override meritorious claims where foreseeability is clear; rescuers and relatives should be treated consistently.
• Lord Russell of Killowen: If foreseeability exists, liability follows; floodgate fears do not justify denial of compensation.
• Lord Scarman: The courts must apply principle (foreseeability and proximity); any broader policy restrictions are for Parliament, not the judiciary.
• Lord Bridge of Harwich: Psychiatric illness claims must be adjudicated case by case; foreseeability is the proper criterion, and arbitrary limits by time, space, or relationship should be avoided.

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Doctrine / Legal Principle

• Liability for nervous shock extends to close relatives who suffer psychiatric illness after witnessing the immediate aftermath of an accident.
• Foreseeability of psychiatric harm, combined with proximity and close relationship, establishes duty of care.
• Policy considerations cannot bar otherwise valid claims; limits must be grounded in principle, not arbitrary categories.

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Disposition

The appeal was allowed. The House of Lords set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision and declared that McLoughlin was entitled to recover damages for psychiatric illness resulting from the accident’s aftermath. The case was remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division for assessment of damages.

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Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

• All five Law Lords concurred in allowing the appeal, though reasoning varied:
  • Lords Wilberforce, Edmund-Davies, Russell, and Bridge emphasized foreseeability and case-by-case adjudication.
  • Lord Scarman agreed but stressed that ultimate policy limits are for Parliament.

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Significance / Notes

• Landmark case extending liability for psychiatric harm beyond immediate presence at an accident to its aftermath.
• Established the tripartite elements for nervous shock claims: class of persons (close relatives), proximity (time and space), and means of perception (direct sight/hearing of aftermath).
• Confirmed that psychiatric illness is a genuine and compensable injury in negligence.
• Influential in subsequent development of tort law in England and Commonwealth jurisdictions.